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The study of persuasion long has been a central preoccupation of 
communication theorists and critics. As a cornerstone in communica­
tion theory. persuasion research has provided the impetus for inquiries 
into how symbolic behavior effects social and personal change. A 
number of metatheoretical issues have emerged from empirical studies 
of gender and persuasibility that are of concern to feminist theorists. 
Scott (1988) argues that poststructural theory, or deconstruction. is an 
avenue for understanding how "traditions of (Western) philosophy 
have systematically and repeatedly construed the world hierarchically 
in tenns of masculine universals and feminine specificities" (p. 33). 
Scott contends that such a construction has put a "conceptual hold" on 
our thinking about gender and behavior (p. 33). Research on gender and 
persuasibility suffers from this conceptual hold and is ripe for 
deconstruction to bring about alternative ways for communication 
theorists tothinkabout the relationship between genderandpersuasibility. 
The following analysis focuses specifically on persuasive messages 
and attitude change rather than the general concept of influenceability 
which entails compliance, agreement, confonruty, and related ideas. 
Between 1930 and 1986, experimental research on gender differ­
ences and persuasibility grew out of a biological-theoretical paradigm 
where sex differences, rather than gender, function as independent 
variables associated with inherent personality traits. resulting in a 
dichotomy where male and female are set in binary opposition. In such 
a dichotomy, meaning is sought primarily from the male position 
(Denida, 1976). What is male is viewed as powerful and positive, in 
contrast to what is female, which is viewed as muted and negative. 
Because of a gender bias. serious questions arise about theory generated 
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from over a fifty~year period of gender and persuasibility research. 
From a feminist perspective, deconstruction (Derrida, 1976) is a valu­
able methodology that can reveal alternative meanings about persua­
sion and gender. 
Feminism and Deconstrudion 
Feminist critiques of science have become popular as feminism 
increasingly removes itself from scientific inquiry. Sayers (1987) 
contends that a feminist rejection of science has "been provoked by the 
failure of science to attend to women's needs and interests" (p. 68). 
Sayers and others (McHugh. Koeske, & Frieze, 1986; Rakow, 1986; 
Wallston & Grady, 1985) have presented cogent arguments outlining 
biases in mainstream scientific research which reflect biases of the 
larger patriarchal society. Feminist criticism argues that social scien­
tific inquiry is not value-free. sexist approaches persist in methodolo­
gies, and generalizabiHty is significantly diminished when the larger 
frame of race, class, and gender is imposed on the interpretation of 
experimental findings. While a feminist perspective admittedly is not 
itself value~free. the alternative approach to interpretation that such 
deconstruction offers is functional for broadening the scopeofscientific 
application to people's lives. 
Deconstruction,like feminism, is a postmodern response that posits 
a world view in which a multiplicity of meanings exist and challenges 
the fallacious concept of dominant truth. In communication studies, 
postmodernism often is viewed as a rhetorical method (Brock, Scott, & 
Cheseboro, 1989). However, upon inspection it is apparent that 
deconstruction is a critical perspective that has application to a wide 
rangeofepistemics, including science (Hare-Mustin & Maracek,1988). 
Science. when viewed as socially~constructed discourse (Gergen, 
1985; Gross, 1990; Krippendorf, 1989; Prelli, 1989. 1990). finds itself 
susceptible tocultural influences which. in Derrida's (1976) estimation, 
leave behind a trace (track, footprint, imprint). Derrida' s (1976) vision 
of deconstruction as a method for tracing cultural aspects of socially 
constructed discourse drew from anthropologist Levi-Strauss' (1962) 
conception of"bricolage" as a "prior science" which is not a specialized 
theoretical approach. but a more global and objective critical tool-one 
that a naive _critic might employ: "This critical search for a new status 
of discourse is the stated abandonment of all reference to a center. to a 
subject. to a privileged reference. .."(Derrida. 1978. p. 286). Therefore, 
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as a "bricoleur," one must seek alternative meanings for discourse by 
abandoning the confines of paradigmatic perspectives to expose the 
limits of the discourse and deny the truth-value of any subjective 
applications. T~is study will attempt to deconstruct gender and 
persuasibility research in the mode of a "bricoleur": to describe specific 
authorities, historical, social, and institutional, that guided researchers' 
choices; identify traces of those authorities in the research; and 
deconstruct discontinuities in the evolution of the research. 
The body of empirical research regarding gender and persuasibility 
evolved as what Foucault (1972) has identified as a discursiveforma­
tion: any socially constructed discourse with a historical and institu­
tional structure. As a discursive formation, traces of specific authorities 
are present in the discourse of the research. These authorities include 
rules and processes of appropriation of discourse that confine the right 
to speak. the ability to understand, and the capacity to invest the 
discourse in decisions, institutions. or practices to a particular group of 
individuals (Foucault, 1972). Deconstruction reveals the function of 
the biological-theoretical paradigm as a specific authority in prototypi­
cal studies within gender and persuasibility research and displays 
discontinuities (or disruptions) in the knowledge that was constructed. 
1930-1970: The Biological Conceptual Field 
The discursive formation is fractured into two periods: The fITst 
(1930-1970). is characterized by alpha bias or exaggeration of sex 
differences; the second (1970-1986) is characterized by beta bias or the 
inclination to ignore or minimize differences. According to Hare­
Mustin and Marecek (1988), "in hypothesis testing, alpha or Type I 
eITOr involves reporting a significant difference when one does not 
exist; beta orType nerror involves overlooking a significant difference 
when one does exist" (p. 457). 
Earlier studies which conceptualized only biological sex exhibited 
significant tendencies toward exaggerating differences in research 
repons and a trend to derive significance from secondary results where 
sex of the subject and persuasibility were not the primary focus. Both 
inclinations are revealed in Cronkhite' s (1969) review of the earlier 
studies: 
Theevidence seems toindicate overwhelmingly that women are 
generally more persuasible than are men. The same relationship 
has been found by Knower (1936), Wegrocki (1934), Bowden, 
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Caldwell, and West (1934), Willis (1940), Bateman and 
Remmers (1941), Haiman (1949), Paulson (1954), Pence and 
Scheidel (1956), King (1959), Janis and Field (1959), Furbay 
(1965), and Schiedel (1963), using various subject populations 
and topics. (p. 136) 
Cronkhite accepts conclusions derived from atheoretical post hoc 
theory building in this review. The fallacy of assuming that biological 
sex increases persuasibility based on the coincidence of the two events 
in time negates consideration of other variables. As Copi (1972) 
observes: "the mere fact ofcoincidence or temporal succession does not 
establish any causal connection" (p. 82). Post hoc explanations for sex 
differences were based on early researchers' predispositions to con­
struct hypotheses in terms of male/female binary opposition, an as­
sumption well-articulated by Cronkhite's statement: "The evidence 
seems to indicate overwhelmingly that women are generally more 
persuasible than are men" (1969, p. 136). That statement represented 
both antecedent assumptions of binary logic and consequential results 
that account for the emerging differences derived by early researchers. 
Such a determinative statement exemplifies Derrida's (1976) master­
concept, differance: the illusion that one or more meanings are 
immediate and present and that one is conscious of those meanings, 
when in fact, such a clarity in comprehension is not the case. "Differance 
becomes the condition ... for the possibility and impossibility of 
conceptualization, idealization, comprehension" (Ormiston, 1988, p. 
48). 
Differance becomes significant when one realizes that not until 
twenty years into the fIrSt of the two marked periods within the gender 
and persuasibility discursive formation were there any theoretical 
connections. Interconnections regarding sex difference results were 
constructed from reports of research based on avaried range ofthematic 
choices that included relationships as divergent as the effects of ethos 
on public speaking (Haiman, 1949) to the influence of scattered versus 
compact seating on audience response (Furbay, 1965). Sex difference 
results often were sought secondarily until the landmark Janis and Field 
study (1959), followed by a similar study by Scheidel (1963). The 
research became a system ofdispersion rather than the linear progres­
sion one might expect from theory building by extension. 
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Janis and Field's (1959) famous Yale study of sex differences and 
personality as factors in persuasibility is a cornerstone in the discursive 
formation, and, as such, it is a specific authority, or what Foucault 
(1972) identifies as a "link point of systematization" (p. 66). Traces of 
Janis andField's (1959) study havepervaded the genderand persuasibility 
discourse to such a degree that Eagly (1978) has called it the "Janis and 
Field (1959) experimental paradigm" (p. 91). 
Janis and Field (1959) conceptualized "persuasibility factor" as 
"any variable attribute within a population that is correlated with 
consistent individual differences in responsiveness to one or more 
classes of influential communications" (pp. 1-2). Alpha bias emerges 
in Janis and Field's (1959) description of their experimentation when 
they state that "a sex comparison was made to test further the hypothesiS 
(derived from earlier studies of suggestibility) that females in our 
society tend to be more persuadible than males" (p. 56). Janis and 
Field's (1959) statement identifying the direction of their hypothesis 
was extracted from a previous study by Terman, Johnson, Kuznets, and 
McNemar (1946) that appeared in Manual ojChild Psychology. The 
source from which the hypothesis was derived reveals the researchers' 
belief (or unconscious predisposition) that females (as objects in a 
general category based solely on biological sex) exist in a state of 
perpetual childhood. It is possible that this assumption might have been 
an influence in Janis and Field's (1959) decision to draw upon an easily 
accessed sample population of high school juniors for subjects. That 
group may have represented the general population in 1959 in terms of 
average educational level, but the choice of such a sample neglected 
effects ofpsychological maturation. In addition, "influential commu­
nications" that the high school juniors were asked toread and give their 
opinions about were articles dealing with civil defense, medical re­
search, politics, and radio and television programs-all written by male 
authors about almost exclusively male occupations at that time. 
Androcentrism repeatedly surfaces in thematic choices and other 
methodological aspects ofJanis and Field's research (1959). Janis and 
Field (1959) unknowingly confessed to such a bias, stating that they 
indeed were operating on the "assumption that cultural determinants of 
persuasibility tend to be relatively stronger in females than males" (p. 
67). But the "culture" to which they refer was incorporated into their 
research only as male culture in the form of written articles about topics 
distant from the lives of women in 1959. What Janis and Field (1959) 
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saw in females as persuasibility factors most likely were "learning 
effects" that occur when a person who possesses little previous knowl­
edge about a topic is persuaded as a result of trying to find out about a 
communicator's position. Janis and Field (1959) were blind to their 
error in excluding female culture. This oversight is revealed in their 
speculation about whether masculine females, like males, are less 
persuadible: 
If "tomboys" and "masculine" women show essentially the 
same pattern of correlations between persuasibility and person­
ality factors as we have found in our male sample, our tentative 
assumption concerning the cultural sources of sex differences in 
persuasibility could be regarded as something more than merely 
a speculative ad hoc explanation. (pp. 67-68) 
Androcentric assumptions of the Janis and Field (1959) paradigm 
make the grounds ofthe theoretical system seem natural, obvious, self­
evident, and universal. Yet, such assumptions have their history, their 
reasons for being the way they are, and their effects on what follows 
from them. The starting point of the theoretical system is a cultural 
construct, usually blind to itself(Derrida, 1981). The cultural construct 
that grounded the ideas in studies that followed Janis and Field (1959) 
is based on fallacious premises of binary logic, where male objects 
signify discretion and maturity while female objects signify gUllibility 
and childishness. 
Under the guise of theory-building by extension, several studies 
emerged from the Janis and Field (1959) "paradigm." These inquiries 
also were based on erroneous premises of binary logic. Studies during 
the 1960s failed to provide fresh insights into the question of the 
relationship between sex differences and persuasibility because they 
replicated Janis and Field's (1959) approach. The studies were framed 
to solidify the authority of the Janis and Field (1959) "paradigm." Had 
these researchers' results been accepted (as they were for a decade), the 
outcome would have been the longstanding domination of a quagmire 
of conclusions suited to the SOCia-political goals of a historical period 
that dictated submissiveness in women. 
The earliest, and most imponant, of the Janis and Field (1959) 
clone-studies was conducted by Scheidel (1963). Scheidel focused on 
sex differences in attitude shift, the extent to which the sexes generalize 
persuasive appeals beyond the specific topic, and the amount ofspeech 
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content which they retain. Subjects were undergraduate students 
enrolled in aspeech course. All data were collected in one class period. 
Scheidel (1963) reponed that women showed significantly more atti­
tude shift, transferred the persuasive appeal more, and retained less of 
the speech. When discussing these results, Scheidel (1963) revealed the 
influence of anterior authorities like Janis and Field (1959), whose 
governing function within the discursive formation continued to per­
petuate traces of alpha bias. Traces of the origins of this alpha 
inclination regarding sex differences arise in an attempt by Scheidel 
(1963) to frame the context of his study with the words: "A summary 
of earlier studies provides the context for an examination of the 
significance of the present investigation" (p. 357). 
Scheidel (1963) confessed to adapting intentionally a methodology 
to connect within the environment that surrounded the earlier studies. 
This act contributed to the alpha bias present in the derived results. The 
difference in Scheidel's (1963) study and Janis and Field's (1959) is not 
to be found in message topics, sources, or cultural considerations, but 
solely in the fact that Scheidel included oral messages instead ofwritten 
articles. Scheidel (1963) seemed to exhibit awareness of methodologi­
cal problems when he drew threeconclusions: (a) knowledge facilitates 
retention, (b) previous knowledge does not explain persuasibility, and 
(c) sound experimental design demands separate analysis for each sex. 
The first and secondconclusions speak to bias which arises from "male" 
topics and the third is a prescription for customizing experimental 
design by separating males and females to remedy the confound of 
'differencesinpriorknowledge. Three alternative meanings for Scheidel's 
conclusions are: (a) one cannot be taught political policies in 11 minutes 
without some prior understanding or experience, (b) persuasibility is a 
multivariate construct that is difficult to conceptualize, and (c) as of 
1963, researchers had neglected to include topics associated with 
female culture in their research. 
These considerations failed to impact other studies in which errors 
similar to Scheidel's (1963) were repeated in the drive to replicate Janis 
and Field (1959). Much like Scheidel (1963), Whittaker and Meade 
(1967) and Singh (1970) believed in the anterior assumptions of the 
Janis and Field (1959) paradigm to such a degree that theirresearch goal 
was to broaden the scope of the Yale studies results. They sought to 
determine if sex differences were universal. 
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In orderto universalize Janis and Field's (1959) findings, Whittaker 
and Meade (1967) replicated the Yale studies' methodology with a 
sample of American and international students. The subjects read 
modified versions of the same written materials about the same topics 
that Janis and Field had used in 1959. Results showed that, at least in 
American culture, sex differences decreased with age, but this was not 
universal. Whittaker and Meade (1967) concluded that "differences 
reflect socially determined sex roles dictating submissiveness in the 
female and independence in the male" (p. 52). Had Whittaker and 
Meade (1967) perceived the effects of social determinism in advance, 
they might have included female culture in the messages and thus 
avoided the fallacious binary logic embedded in the conception of male 
independenceoverfemale submissiveness. Nevertheless, a subsequent 
study by Singh (1970) revived Janis and Field (1959) one more time to 
testa Hindi·speaking, Indian sample. Predictably, Singh (1970) again 
produced similar results. 
The only apparent universalities that existed in the first period of the 
gender and persuasibility discursive fonnation were the lack of validity 
and utility of the binary perspective regarding sex differences in the 
biological·theoretical paradigm. Theory·building by extension in the 
1960s had gone awry, leaving the preliminary discontinuities of the 
1930s, 1940s, and 1950s capped with a final decade of empirical 
stagnation. By 1974, the system spiraled in a different direction. 
1974·1986: The Psychological Conceptual Field 
Not until 1974 were the underlying assumptions of the biological­
theoretical paradigm challenged. A fracture appeared in the research: 
Another discontinuous sequence of studies emerged, characterized not 
by alpha bias but by beta bias. or the inclination to ignore sex differ· 
ences. This second period of research produced empirical inquiries that 
gestated in an environment which had become radically altered from its 
initial androcentric state before 1974. This alteration was the result of 
the influence of historicaVculturai phenomena such as the women's 
liberation movement. These second period studies were mutations of 
protest. spawned by the secondary status imposed on females by the 
philosophical constructions of binary logic during the first period. 
Second period researchers constructed theories of gender and 
persuasibility with active aversion for frrst period theories, which were 
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seen as devaluing the female experience. wrenching control ofmeaning 
from that experience, and dictating to women what they should think. 
Despite the backlash against earlier studies. the presence of prior 
research remained in the very act of empirical revolt. First period 
research is absent and present in second period discourse becauseearlier 
studies are "authorities" whose assumptions were marked for erasure. 
A rationale for this intention to erase prior assumptions appears in 
Rosenfeld and Christie's (1974) charge that earlier studies ponrayed 
women as "malleable sex kittens" (p. 244). The irony is that second 
period researchers set out to erase their predecessors through the same 
rules of appropriation regarding scientific discourse. 
Rosenfeld and Christie (1974) tested sex differences by asking 
subjects tochange neutral attitudes toward meaningless trigrams (groups 
ofthree letters such as XOM) "to the attitude that they held for the nouns 
associated with the trigrams" (p. 248). Those who did this were deemed 
more persuasible. They found no more attitude change in women than 
in men in 13 out of 15 comparisons. Conclusions were that content· 
boundresults should not be used to support conclusions and that women 
are growing away from "traditional" dependence upon others. 
Rosenfeld and Christie's (1974) fll'St observation concerning ef­
fects of content-bound results reflected a desire to distance themselves . 
from previous studies which had excluded female experience from the 
content of persuasive communications. This desire to erase errors led 
Rosenfeld and Christie (1974) to employ their trigram approach. a 
method in which an absence of meaning (which the researchers called 
"neutrality") was posed as the solution to the content problem in 
persuasive messages. By erasing meaning, Rosenfeld and Christie 
(1974) compromised their research. The trigram method erased persua­
sion as a concept meaning to induce to believe or convince, and replaced 
that concept with free association. Thus, the researchers reject persua­
sion as a process in humans that is (to some degree) con,tent-bound and 
context dependent. The most pronounced question about Rosenfeld 
and Christie' s (1974) results was whether it is possible to produce new 
meanings by transferring attitudes about isolated nouns to meaningless 
configurations composed of letters of the alphabet. 
Nevertheless, Rosenfeld and Christie ( 1974) did articulate an influ­
ential new assumption with their second conclusion that women are 
growing away from traditional dependence (although none of their 
methods or empirical results supported that conclusion). Rosenfeld and 
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Christie's (1974) separation of women from traditional dependence 
was the fust oven social statement in second period research. Follow­
ing the Rosenfeld and Christie study of 1974, a "question everything" 
paradigm wouldemerge to setoff anew waveofgenderand persuasibility 
studies as problematic as the original studies conducted between 1930 
and 1959. Second wave studies, like the originals, covered a range of 
thematic choices: from androgyny (Montgomery & Burgoon, 1977; 
Montgomery & Burgoon, 1980) to the significance of the sex of 
researchers (Ward, Seccombe, Bendel, & Carter. 1985). 
The epicenter of the new paradigm was a radically different per­
spectiveon gender as an object ofinquiry. Bem (1974) reconfigured the 
concept of gender by offering researchers a measurement of psycho­
logical androgyny in the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI). Bem 
conceptualized gender as a continuous variable of psychological self­
attributions, from masculine to feminine and all points in between. The 
BSRI consists of sixty personality characteristics which Bem (1974) 
believed were items that are perceiVed to differentiate aspects of gender. 
Twenty characteristics were deemed masculine. twenty feminine, and 
twenty neutral. Bem(1974) selected the itemsaccording to whether 100 
college students considered them more masculine or feminine. Con­
sttucted to measure psychological gender, the BSRI allowed for mea­
surement of a wide range of gender orientations from masculine to 
androgynous to feminine. 
Bem's (1974) multifaceted conception of gender as a psychological 
orientation represented an alternative to the bipolar conception of sex 
differences in the biological-theoretical paradigm. The BSRI tempo­
rarily dissolved tenets of binary logic regarding biological sex. The 
BSRI seemed the antithesis of the more parsimonious, but less inclu­
sive, binary conception of sex differences based on biological condi­
tions. However, due to an institutionalized societal system of signifi­
cation inextricably bound to androcentric Western epistemology, Bem 
(1974) failed to break from binary logic with the item pool collected for 
the BSRI. 
Havingcategorizedtwenty masculine items, twenty feminine items, 
and twenty neutral items, Bem (1974) actually consttucted twenty 
separate binary opposites dependent on perceptions of 100 college 
students whose conceptualizations were directly derived from their 
cultural experiences. The twenty neutral terms reveal traces of Bem' s 
(1974) conception of an idealized center, a privileged other-the 
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midpoint on the binary continuum. This ideal otheris perceived by Bem 
as defying the social system of binary signification that bore the 
masculine and feminine items. Androgyny is the perfect center, a blend1 of the best of the binary. But, as such. androgyny never exists beyond8 binary logic and is confined to that system of signification. Thus, 
androgyny became another divisive element in gender research. 
Montgomery and Burgoon (1977; 1980) assumed the validity ofthe 
BSRI as a measure ofpsychological gender orientation. The research­
ers utilized the BSRI in two gender and persuasibility studies in lieu of 
a two-valued binary conception of sex differences. In their frrst study. 
they supponed the hypothesis that "traditionally sex-typed females will 
change their attitudes significantly more than will traditionally sex­
typed males . . . this difference will be greater than the difference 
between androgynous males and females" (1977. p. 132). 
In their second study, Montgomery and ,Burgoon (1980) examined 
effects of androgyny and message expectations on resistance to persua­
sive messages. They believed sex-type of the source would create 
expectations in the receiver about the message and that positive expect­
ancy violations would induce change. whereas negative violations 
would inhibit change. They also believed that positive or negative 
violations depended on the sex-type of the receiver (as assessed by the 
BSRI). 
The experiment "involved making a decision about where children 
in a financially troubled orphanage should be taken on a field trip" 
(Montgomery & Burgoon, 1980, p. 60). A nontraditionally sex-typed 
male, "a male nurse, member of the anisan' s guild, and one who works 
with small children and enjoys cooking" (p. 61). advocated a football 
game as an option. A traditionally sex-typed male, "a member of the 
track team. physical education major. consttuction worker, and one 
who enjoys outdoor activities" (p. 61). advocated an arts and crafts 
show. Montgomery and Burgoon (1980) supponed a three-way inter­
action between expectancy and source sex-type and receiver sex-type. 
"Results indicated no significant attitude differences among traditional 
receivers" (p. 65). 
The fmt study (Montgomery & Burgoon, 1977) found "tradition­
ally sex-typed females demonstrating more positive attitudes than 
androgynous females" (p. 133). The opposite occurred among tradi­
tionally sex-typed males and androgynous males. However, in the 1980 
study, where differences in attitude change between traditionally sex­
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typed males and females were directly tested. sans androgyny, no 
significant main effects for sex-type occurred. The 1977 and 1980 
results fail to support one another because significant differences in 
attitude change were found between traditional sex-types and androgy­
nous sex-types. but none were found between ttaditionally sex-typed. 
extreme ends of the Bem continuum. 
Perhaps the artificial sex-typed sources confounded the results? 
Could amale "nurse-artist-babysitter-cook" advocating a football game 
or an "athlete-construction worker-outdoorsman tt advocating an art 
show have been too extreme to warrant believable message expectancy 
violations? One is hard-pressed to produce reflections of such personae 
in society at large. An additional extremity was Montgomery and 
Burgoon' s jaded conception of persuasibility as "an enduring person­
ality syndrome" (1977, p. 130) which nears the definition of a mental 
illness. By arguing that "people high in persuasibility would be 
expected to have extremely unstable attitude structures" (p. 130), the 
researchers deny content and contextual factors associated with suc­
cessful and unsuccessful persuasion (which undermines their own 
study); instead, they label persuasibility as a relatively enduring afflic­
tion to which ttaditionally sex-typed females are most readily suscep­
tible. The Montgomery and Burgoon studies (1977; 1980) were trend­
setters. but they mistakenly used the BSRI to support traditional 
conceptualizations of men and women and linked those stereotypes to 
an excessive definition of persuasibility. The researchers displayed 
strong adherence to binary logic in their thinking. the predisposition 
from which they tried to break. 
As second period research progressed into the 1980s, researchers 
identified a bias associated with sex of researchers who conducted 
gender and persuasibility studies. Eagly and Carli (1981) conducted a 
meta-analysis of the research which supported a link between alpha and 
beta biases and the biological sex of researchers. They supported the 
hypothesis that sex of researchers was a factor in determining sex 
differences (1981). Male researchers obtained larger sex differences in 
the direction of greater persuasibility. whereas female researchers 
found no sex difference. Eagly and Carli (1981) concluded that 
"researchers may design. implement. or report their studies in away that 
results in an egotistical or flattering porttayal of the attributes of their 
own gender" (p. 17). 
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Ward, Seccombe, Bendel. and Carter (1985) continued on the 
metatheoretical path with the assumption that "status inequalities in the 
larger society influence sex differences in persuasion in experimental 
contexts through the confirmation of role-related expectancies" (p. 
269). They hypothesized that "reports of greater female persuasibility 
may have been confounded by the cross-sex content of the communi­
cation situation" (p. 269). Moderate support was derived. 
The metatheoretical mode adopted by researchers who followed 
Montgomery and Burgoon (1977; 1980) challenged prior researchers' 
assumptions of objectivity across both periods of the discursive forma­
tion. Metatheoreticians paired alpha bias with male researchers and 
beta bias with female researchers within an environment that appeared 
to affect results according to experimenters' awareness of existing 
status inequalities in society. The presence of these metatheoretical 
accusations in the progression (or digression) of second period research 
was oneof empirical confession or aCknowledgmentof failure to escape 
the binary logic that underpins the variable-analytic tradition. 
Becker (1986) followed earlier metatheoretical inquiries of the 
1980s with another meta-analysis of the gender and persuasibility 
research that challenged results of the Eagly and Carli (1981) meta­
analysis. Becker (1986) reported that though several ofthe predictors 
were significant. the Eagly and Carli (1981) model did not adequately 
explain the variability in the outcomes of previous studies. Becker 
concluded that "any claims of simple experimenter bias or expectancy 
(e.g.• women conform more when male investigators expect that they 
will) must be qualified: perhaps women conform more because the 
norm group is larger or the test was longer or the message was stronger" 
(p.204). 
Becker's meta-analysis marked an impasse in a discursive forma­
tion that had evolved in disparate directions for over fifty years. By 
1986 it was evident that gender and persuasibility research was riddled 
with extraneous influences and multidirectional biases. Becker's 
criticisms of Eagl y and Carli's (1981) quantification of previous studies 
spoke to inherent problems of statistical analysis in social scientific 
inquiries in general: whether researchers accurately measure highly 
complex. multivariate. psychological constructs. Whatever specula­
tion may be offered. it is evident that the discursive formation that is 
gender and persuasibility imploded after fifty years, leaving the debris 
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of mute results and a number of questions-theoretical and 
metatheoretical. 
Discussion 
Genderand persuasibUity research leaves no traceof generalizability 
of human behavior. After fifty years of experimentation, it remains 
unknown whether women and men differ in persuasibility, nor can we 
be sure it matters (O'Keefe. 1990). Yet, women and men still are treated 
as distinct audiences requiring specific appeals and messages. An­
drogyny, often confused with homosexuality or bisexuality, confounds 
the issue. 
Theory growth ·by extension, assumed by many scientists to be a 
logical, orderly process (Littlejohn, 1992), is challenged in the body of 
theory addressing gender and persuasibility. Two periods of research 
marked by opposing biases, and by post hoc theorizing in the fast 
period, call into question any consistency or linearity in the logic of 
explanation that could constitute theory. Only fragmented findings 
remain that loosely connect because sex differences, gender, and 
persuasibility were objects of inquiry. 
Deconstruction demonstrates the impossibility of eliminating the 
influence of culturally ingrained systems of signification that confound 
objectivity implied by empiriCism. A case in point is the second period 
of gender and persuasibility research. in which the Bem Sex-Role 
Inventory (BSRI) was utilized to operationalize gender. The BSRI 
translates socially constructed attitudes about men and women into a 
synoptic system of signification embodied by the instrument. The 
reflective signification system constructed by the BSRI perpetuates the 
oppositional identity inherent in society. The centerpoint, androgyny, 
a concept which promised to liberate the bipolar system of sex roles, is 
a fusion of traditional traits that Putnam claims "fails to divorce gender 
from assumptions of duality" (1982, p. 1). In addition, the BSRI fails 
to account for major cultural shifts in assumptions about gender which 
occur over time. Fecteau, Jackson, and Dindia (1992) attest to temporal 
problems regarding current perceptions of masculine and feminine 
traits in the BSRI. They claim that it cannot be discerned when the BSRI 
and similar scales "began to lose content validity" (p. 31). 
The difficulty in understanding how gender relates to communica­
tive behavior repeatedly has been debated (Putnam, 1982; Rakow, 
1986). Prior assumptions and resear~h practices which utilize gender 
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as an independent variable are suspect. One school of thought. articu­
lated by Putnam, suggests that gender more appropriately would be 
researched as a dependent variable where communicative behaviors 
define gender. Persuasibility consistently has been categorized as a 
personality trait, a dependent variable. Ifgender were categorized as a 
dependent variable. entirely different cognitive processes could be 
revealed, perhaps paving the way for research connected to a compre­
hensive framework such as Petty and Cacioppo's (1986) Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (ELM). 
To date, however, the work of Petty and Cacioppo (1986) has failed 
to link genderto the persuasion process. A single experiment (Cacioppo 
& Petty. 1980) was conducted to test gender as a peripheral cue in 
... 	 cognitive processing based on priorknowledgeoftopic. That study was 
confounded by alpha bias in Cacioppo and Petty's (1980) use offootball 
and fashion photographs as persuasive materials designed toexaggerate 
biological sex differences. Equating biological sex differences with 
gender, they exhibited the same archaic, binary assumptions of fast 
period researchers. 
At this juncture. the very proposition that gender plays a critical role 
in attitude change is questionable. Eagly and Wood (1985) argue that 
gender as a personality trait is compromised across situation and 
therefore does not function in the simple manner that researchers 
assume. They suggest that "perceived demands inherent in social roles 
and the impact that status-based expectancies have on behavior" (1985. 
p.25O) may illuminate gender-related behavior and influenceability. 
Therefore, status differences relating to social roles require examina­
tion, especially in light of expectancies for persuasibility when gender 
and status interact to produce power differentials in public settings. 
Similarly, examination of authority, a criterion in deconstruction, 
displays academic willingness to accept readily precedent with regard 
to gender. In contemporary textbooks (Pearson, Turner. & Todd­
Mancillas, 1991) the reader. who usually is a student, is led to believe 
that gender is a valuable predictor of persuasibility. The resulting 
uncritical adherence to precedent subjugates creative thinking and 
reduces textbooks to onerous descriptions of research findings rather 
than vehicles for teaching critical thinking skills. 
Deconstruction questions science as absolute authority and advo­
cates holistic critical analysis. Theory. after all, is a social construction 
subject to multiple interpretations over time. Adherence to a past which 
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constrains the present is a fallacy ofrelevance. To the question. "Should 
scientists reopen the case of gender and persuasibility?" the most logical 
answer is "no." There are too many reasons to believe that inconsisten­
cies surrounding this body of theory render the relationship null. 
Deconstruction has revealed biases in a body of research plagued with 
false assumptions about the behavior of women and men. By levelling 
the discourse, researchers are liberated to pursue alternative directions 
to construct knowledge that cor(responds) with the present rather than 
the fallacious perspectives of a largely meaningless past. 
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